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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the owners of an aircraft to recover
from the insurer and/or the insurance agent their losses sustained
in the destruction of the aircraft and an action between the
insurer and the insurance agent to apportion such liability
between them.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the plaintiffs, Stephen F. Kesler,
W. T. Bissell, Ronald McClain, Elmo Walker, Donald L. Oborn, and
the plaintiff-intervenor, Gary Ferguson, collectively (hereafter
referred to as "Plaintiffs"), a judgment against Donald A. Dyson
and L. F. Dyson & Associates, jointly and severally (hereafter
referred to as "the Dysons"), in the amount of $20,294.76.
Ranger Insurance Company and Aviation Office of America (hereafter
referred to as "Ranger/AOA") were awarded a judgment of "no cause
of action" on all claims against them.

from this action of the

trial court, the Dysons have appealed, l/and the plaintiff's have
eros s- appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs are seeking the following relief from this
Court:

ll

Kenneth R. Shannon, pilot of the aircraft at the time it was destroyed
was a defendant below and based upon his default, a judgment was entered
against him and in favor of the plaintiffs, plus Donald A. Dyson, in the
amount of $25,368.45. That judgment is not at issue in this appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. For an Order of this Court reversing the trial court
and awarding plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor attorneys fees
in this matter, including this appeal;
B. For an Order of this Court reversing the trial court
and awarding them 10. 58/o interest on the judgment from date of los:
C. Pursuant to Rule 73(1), awarding them the amount of
their judgment against the Dysons plus 25% thereof as damages
for the Dysons frivolous and delaying appeal of plaintiffs'

judgm::~

D. For an Order of this Court dismissing the Dysons'
appeal of plaintiffs' judgment; and,
E. For an Order of this Court entering a Declaratory

Juc~·

ment against the Dysons, declaring them liable to Gary Ferguson
for his liability, if any, to Donald Oborn resulting from the
loss of the aircraft.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 18, 1975, Donald A. Dyson, Donald L. Oborn,
Stephen F. Kesler, W.T. Bissell and Ronald McClain purchased a

1968 Cessna Aircraft.

The aircraft was financed by Walker Bank

& Trust Company upon a promissory note entered into jointly and
severally by the above owners (exhibit 36).

Simultaneously, the

owners requested Donald A. Dyson to procure insurance on the air·
craft, inasmuch as he is a licensed insurance agent and an employee and owner of L.F. Dyson & Associates, Inc., an insurance
agency licensed to sell aircraft insurance in the State of Utah.
I

Dyson agreed to procure and maintain insurance in force and effec: ;
on the aircraft in the amount of $27,000.00, the purchase price
of the aircraft (R. 365,383,767,768).

Dyson received a com-

mission on the sale of the insurance for the aircraft (R. 557).
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Thereafter, McClain sold his interest in the aircraft to Oborn

;nd: Walker.

For both of these sales, Dyson caused the insurance

policies to be endorsed to provide coverage for them as pilots of
the aircraft.

In December, 1975, Dyson sold his interest in the

aircraft to Shannon.

Dyson also submitted a request to Ranger

Insurance Company that Shannon be added as a pilot of the aircraft
ooder the insurance policy.

Before receiving confirmation that

Shannon had been added as a pilot under the insurance policy, Dyson
delivered the keys to the aircraft to Shannon.
On February 1, 1976, with Shannon at the controls, the
aircraft crashed, causing injuries to the occupants and totally
destroying the aircraft.

The plaintiffs filed a claim against

Ranger Insurance Company for the loss of the aircraft.

Ranger

denied the claim since an endorsement had never been issued covering Shannon.
~ued

Thereafter, Dyson and the other owners met and,

upon Dyson's representation that Shannon was a covered pilot

IK. 785) filed suit against Ranger.

When it became apparent that

Dyson had never received a written endorsement adding Shannon as
apilot, the other owners filed suit in a Third Party Claim
against Dyson and his insurance agency on the basis of breach of
contract to procure insurance and negligence in failing to obtain
coverage for Shannon while piloting the aircraft.
Gary Ferguson was not initially a party in the action.
However, when it became apparent that Donald Oborn, Ferguson's
Hsignor, intended to claim against Ferguson based upon their
contract, and that Ferguson might be collaterally estopped to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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assert defenses in that action if he did not participate in this
one, he was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff.

The court

ruled, however, that the question of his relationship to Oborn was
not a matter of dispute in this suit and ruled that he was forced
to participate on the same basis as the other plaintiffs.?/
POINT I
THE DYSONS' APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS' JUDGMENT IS
TOTALLY WITHOUT tfERIT, IS FRIVOLOUS AND SOLELY
FOR DELAY AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED. PLAINTIFFS
ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE AS DAl'1AGES AN ~10UNT
EQUAL TO 25/~ OF THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM.
The Dysons have failed to contest plaintiff's judgment rend·
ered against them.

Their Statement of Points on Appeal and their

brief contain absolutely no exception to the trial court's findings
supporting the determination of their liability to plaintiffs on
both breach of contract and negligence.
dismissed.

Their appeal should be

Accordingly, Respondents find it unnecessary to address

the issues raised by the Dysons in their brief.

Since they have

acquiesced in plaintiff's judgment, this court's determination of
the issue raised regarding the Dysons right to jury trial can not
affect that judgment.
Rule 73(1) provides:
"(1) Dismissal of Appeal; Penalty for Delay. Failure of the
appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the review of the
case, except filing notice of appeal and depositing the fees therefo",
shall not affect the validity of the appeal but is ground for such
actions as the district court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal. On the trial of the cause on appeal, i;' ;:
appears to the court that the appeal was made sol<?liA fer• ki.l;t, it may
add to the costs such damages as may be just, not exceeding twenty-fi"
per cent of the judgment appealed from." (Emphasis added)

This rule is similar to Rule 38, Federal Rules of Appellate
Jj See discussion page 10, infra.
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~ocedure.

Under that rule,

it has been held that where the appeal

is made solely for the purose of delay, the court may award attorney fees in addition to damages.
554 2d. 539 (2nd Cir.

.JaJ•:;:c.r:.i,
::;.mo:?Y'71~·':;
~ule

];Jq

1977).

i'u-cua: ·~"~s:;c.Z:jj ·:ompc.n!J,

~ule

. 02, pp. 4251

Deposit

Co •

See, Oscar Gruss & Son

422 F.2d 1278 (2nd Cir. 1970).

38 is discussed generally in

9, 1238.01 and

~

m:;eP •;. Fide!iry

<'1o_!r8 's ?ederaZ Practice,

""" sea.

Volume

In applying rules similar to

73(1) in other jurisdictions, the courts have consistently

;pplied the penalties where there was no probable cause to appeal
the judgment [See, e.g., 5:er:ing v. Dairy De!ire, Inc.
262 Or.

359 (1952);

? 2d 753, 147 Mont.

:u-:,:'rt v. !')rryi!'e Savings :1r:d :, ..J.ln

494 P.2d 292,
Asso~iatic'",

410

124 (1966)] and where the findings were amply

rupported by the evidence and the appeal was merely taken on
seneral grounds [See, 2.J.,
;~j

(1952)

:-!a::;ro~.J

v. F!i"T2r, 246 P.2d 54,

112 Ca.2d

l.

In this case, the trial court found

(l)

that the Dysons

1ad breached their contract to provide insurance coverage while
t~e

aircraft was being piloted by Shannon;

~son,
:nc.,

(2) that Donald A.

individually and as agent for L. F. Dyson and Associates,
was negligent in allowing Shannon to operate the aircraft

?rior to obtaining insurance coverage for him;

(3)

that his neg-

ligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages, and;
14) awarded judgment against him and his agency (R.

l7l, 742).

349. 353.

Although the Dysons stated in their Notice of Appeal

:~at they were appealing this judgment,
~n~ that claim,

they have totally aban-

contesting neither the judgment nor the findings

'?on which the judgment was based.

The intent of their appeal is
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to secure indemnification from Ranger/AOA.

They say in their

statement of "Relief Sought on Appeal":
"Plaintiff Donald A. Dyson, as one of the Owners, seeks reversal of
the trial court's judgment in favor of AOA and Ranger on plaintiffs'
Complaint; and Donald A. Dyson and L.F. Dyson & Associates, as thirdparty defendants and counter-claimants, seek reversal of the trial
court's judgment against them in favor of AOA and Ranger on Dysons'
Counterclaim and pray that the trial court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Dysons against AOA and Ranger in che swry · -· ;nc.
judgmenr; entered in favor of the ula.inti/,-~s c1ga~nst ":hem." (emphasis
added) [App. Br. p.2]

The failure to contest the plaintiffs' judgment against
them, makes it apparent that they are hoping for a judgment of
this court which will shift liability for the plaintiffs'
from them to Ranger I AOA.

Of course,

they do not want to pay any

money now if that contingency were to happen.

Obviously, they

have appealed plaintiff's judgment solely to delay making
on the judgment.

losses

Absent an appeal, the Dysons would have

::~:::,:

upon which to stay execution of plaintiff's judgment against th9

ef.

Rule 62(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Replacement Vo. 9B

(1953 Rev.ed.).

This maneuver by the Dysons clearly falls into

the proscription of Rule 73(1); it is precisely the offensive
abuse of the appellate process which Rule 73 (l), Federal Rule 38.
and similar rules in other jurisdictions are designed to prev~t
This court in this case is clearly warranted in assessing damages
against the Dysons.
That the plaintiffs' have suffered damages because of this
frivolous appeal is obvious;

they have had to obtain counsel

to prosecute this appeal and they have had to pay 10.
on the note to Walker Bank

& Trust

58~~

interest

Company with the expectancy

of receiving a maximum of 3% interest when the judgment is final!
executed upon.

The damages the plaintiffs

have
'uffered
in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
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.:::.1.

case, however, go far beyond this appeal.

For the duration of

this case, they have been locked into waiting while Ranger/AOA
and the Dysons litigated who would be responsible for plaintiffs'
admitted loss.

At trial, the Dysons stipulated that if insurance

coverage were found not to exist, they would be liable to the
plaintiffs (R. 346-47, 349, 353, 371, 742).

After this stipulation

was entered, however, plaintiffs' counsel were required to spend
five more days in court (R. 374).
ery and through the trial,

All during the time of discov-

the plaintiffs were required to pay

10.58% interest on the note with Walker Bank.

The delay and

added costs of this appeal should not be borne by plaintiffs;
the full 257o penalty should be assessed against the Dysons.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEY FEES.
While expenses of litigation and attorney fees are
normally not recoverable unless expressly provided by contract
~statute,

in both contractual and tortious cases such expenses

and attorney fees have been awarded where the actions by the
liable party has caused the claimant to be involved in litigation
'.lith third parties.
~A.L.R.3d 270.

See, 22 AM. Jur. 2d. §166; 45 A. L. R. 2d 1183;

This court considered the question in In Re

c'oast Tic;Ze C.·m:J:>l~l v. Har•tford,

325 P. 2d 906 (1958).
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In that case, Hartford had provided a bond upon which Pacific was
the obligee.

When the contractor failed to perform and Pacific

was required to incur attorneys fees in settlement of claims of
materialmen, this court allowed Pacific to recover its attorney
fees from Hartford on its bond.

The court stated, at 379:

The rule as to what damages are recoverable for breach of contract
is based upon the concept of reasonable forseeability.
That loss
of such general character would result from the breach. Therefore,
to be compensable, the loss must result from the breach in a natural and usual course of events so that it can fairly and reasonably be said that if the minds of the parties had averted to breach
when the contract was made, loss of such character would be within
their contemplation."
"Applying the above rule to this case:
It would reasonably be
foreseen that the natural and usual consequence of Cassidy's
failure to pay the labors and materialmen would bring about
the series of events which occurred:
that liens would be filed
and legal proceedings instituted to enforce them; That Plaintiff
Title Company, having the duty to keep the titles clear, would
interpose defenses and attend to some disposition of the claims,
which would require the services of attorney's and court costs
incidental thereto.
This is the type of loss for which Hartford's Bond was given to guard against."

The trial court reviewed the above authority but, in
applying that authority to the facts of this case, ruled that

t~

plaintiff's attorneys fees were incurred in asserting their claic:'
against Dyson and not in litigation with third parties.

Plaintif: I

1

submit that the trial court misapplied the law in this case in the
following particulars:
A.

It is not disputed that when the aircraft was damaged

and Ranger/AOA refused coverage, Dyson insisted to his co-owners
that there was coverage for the aircraft and convinced them to
secure counsel and file suit against Ranger/AOA (R. 748-49, 775-6,
785).

Even the trial court acknowledged in its memorandum decisic:

that the plaintiffs did not sever their relationship with Dyson
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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until after Ranger I AOA had answered their complaint.

By this time

che plaintiffs were in litigation which, under the terms of the
8olicy as

>wgLgen~::ci Ol"ocurred

by Dyson, they could not maintain direc-

ely against Ranger/AOA.
B.

As recognized at the outset of the trial, it was appar-

ent that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from either
Ranger/AOA or the Dysons.

The plaintiffs were, however, forced

' co participate in the lawsuit because of their being moving

' parties in initiating the action and because they could not be
~leased

from attendance at the trial.

(R. 374).

The record

clearly indicates that at the outset of the trial, the parties
~ade

several attempts to reach stipulations which would have

allowed a judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiffs
regarriless of how the liability was apportioned between Ranger/AOA
and the Dysons.

(R.

350-351; 353; 369; 372; 518; 616-623)

However, failure to agree to the entry of such a stipulated
judgment necessitated plaintiffs' counsel's continued attendance
at the proceedings .
C.
1

From the record (R. 793-796), it is clear that the

~lk of plaintiffs'

attorneys fees were incurred in the lengthy

trial of the matter which lasted more than five days and preparation directly related to that trial.
~at the plaintiffs'

There can be no question

attorneys fees were incurred as a direct and

?roximate result of Dyson's negligence and breach of contract.
Furthermore, such an expense was clearly foreseeable from Dyson's
action in naming himself as the only "named insured" and in failing
to secure coverage for Shannon as a pilot.

Because of Dyson's
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role in the selection of counsel and initiation of a lawsuit
against Ranger/AOA ( which he knew or should have known as an
expert in the insurance business, could not be maintained because
of his negligence in only naming himself as "named insured") he
should now be estopped from denying that the attorneys fees incur-

red by plaintiffs were incurred in maintaining their action agains:
third parties.
D.

The plaintiff-intervenor, Gary Ferguson, stands in

somewhat different shoes than the other plaintiffs.

As a purchase:

of an interest in the aircraft from Donald Oborn, one of the
original owners, he was not directly involved in procurring the
insurance, nor was he directly obligated on the note with Walker
Bank.

Ferguson's counsel repeatedly attempted to introduce

evidence of the relationship between Oborn and Ferguson, but was
not allowed to do so by the Trial Judge (R. 324-325; 360-361;
365-368; 619).1/

Ferguson suffered certain damages from the loss

of the aircraft, but his biggest potential loss was his potential

li

Part of the evidence which Ferguson attempted to introduce to the Court
related to Oborn's claim against Ferguson under their agreement for all
damages such as Oborn might sustain (e.g., interest on the Walker Bank
note, attorneys fees, etc.), and Ferguson's assertion that by instituting
the action against the Dysons, Oborn had made an election under their
agreement (Exhibit 1-PF) to declare a forfeiture and to retain all sums paic
as liquidated damages. Ferguson's position was, therefore, that he was
relieved of any obligation to Oborn and Oborn was entitled to receive all
proceeds of the insurance. In that case, Ferguson would have no need to
participate in the litigation in the instant case. Ferguson's counsel
participated in the pre-trial settlement conference for the sole purpose
of allowing the parties to resolve all disputes in the event settlement
were reached. After settlement negotiations had failed, the suggestion
by Judge Baldwin (presiding atthe pre-tn.al settlement conference) that
Ferguson might be collaterally estopped from asserting claims against
Dyson that would be litigated in this action made Ferguson's participation
in this trial a necessity.
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liability to Oborn.

If Oborn sued Ferguson, he would file a third-

party complaint against Dyson based upon breach of

contract and

negligence, precisely the issues being litigated in this case.

It

,,as this possibility that led to the collateral estoppel suggestion.
Obviously, the only reason for Ferguson participating in this trial
at all was to obtain a declaratory judgment against Dyson on the
liability issue.

Despite the evidence supporting such relief,

the court refused to grant it.

(R. 822-824)

Further, the Dyson 1 s

cooosel resisted any attempt by Ferguson to raise this issue (R.360,

366).

1

Clearly, Ferguson s predecessor in interest was competently

~presented

by Mr. Hintze and Ferguson really had no reason to be

in the lawsuit except for that declaratory relief.

1

Yet, he was

1

involved because of Judge Baldwin s suggestion of collateral
estoppel and, even more basically, because of the Dysons breach
of contract and negligence in failing to obtain insurance for the

aircraft while being piloted by Shannon.

Ferguson gainsed nothing

mre from his participation in this trial than he would have gained
had he not been in it at all.

Clearly he falls within the class

of individuals entitled to receive attorneys fees under the

above authority.

1

Furthermore, since the Dyson s counsel opposed

Ferguson litigating for declaratory relief, they should now be
1

estopped from denying that Ferguson s attorneys fees were incurred
in litigation with third parties.
POINT III

I

I
I
.........__

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
THE ACTUAL INTEREST INCURRED BY
PLAINTIFFS ON THE NOTE WITH WALKER
BANK & TRUST COMPANY FROM THE DATE OF
LOSS UNTIL THE DATE OF PAYMENT.
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In making an award of damages for breach of contract, the
Court attempts to put the injured party in as good a position as
he would have been had the contract been fully performed.
Pmti,

514 P.2d 823 (Alaska, 1973).

· ,_,

The desired objective in

computing damages is to evaluate any loss suffered by the most
direct, practical and accurate method.
448 P.2d 709, 22 Utah2d 49 (1968).
H,n•tj'ord, infra.

Even Cd.ds, Inc:. u . .v> ·..;,

See also, ?J.u,:fic•

--~~=·

>:,

~·.

The evidence before the court in this case was

uncontroverted that the time of the crash of the aircraft, there
was a principal balance due on the promissory note at Walker Bank
in the amount of $25,350.79 (R. 790) and that the note bore interest at the rate of 10. 58'7. per annum (R. 790, 776).

Since Dyson

was one of the obligor's on the promissory note, there can be no
question but what it was foreseeable on his part that if the
aircraft were destroyed and insurance coverage was not obtained,
he and the other obligators would be required to make payment on
the note and would have to pay the 10.58% interest rate.

The tria~

judge ruled that interest at the 10.58% rate was not allowable sinco
the plaintiffs would have had to pay that interest rate regardless
of Dyson's actions.

His position is untenable.

If the contract

had not been breached, the insurer would have paid for the loss anc
the plaintiffs would not have been required to pay the higher interest while Ranger/AOA and the Dysons were squabbling about who
was liable to the plaintiffs.

If the aircraft had not been

destroyed, the plaintiffs would have paid the higher interest, but
they would have had the use of their aircraft.

Hhile it is clear:

foreseeable that some incidental interest differential might accrJt'
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in the 30 to 60 days required to make settlement on the insurance
claim. but for the breach of contract and negligence of the
~sons,

the plaintiffs would not have paid the interest at the

higher rate for the period of time that they have.

The trial

judge's failure to make the Dysons pay the higher interest rate
is unfathomable when one considers that, as a joint obligator on
~e

note, Dyson was contractually responsible for paying 10.58%

an~ay.

In effect, Dyson has agreed to pay the higher rate of

interest.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERB.ED B NOT GRA..~TING
GARY FERGUSON A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
AGAI~ST THE DYSONS.
As pointed-out above,

the only reason for Ferguson being

in the lawsuit was to obtain judgme:1t against the Dysons, declaring them to be liable to him for claims which Oborn might
make based •J.pon the agreement ber..Teen Ferguson and Oborn.

The

evicence clear:.:' re:lects that Dyson was a·..Tare of Ferguson's interest in

:~e

Oborn (:Z. 400,

aircra:: and !lis p•.1rchase of that interest from
/j7-j5).

J:;son ::.ace representations to Ferguson

and to the other owners that he had acquired insurance on the
aircraft ·n-:1:.:e ':Jein; pC:..:.o:ed b:; Shannon (!\.

750-51).

Clearly,

his neglige:1ce ar:c! breac:-. c: contract, as found by the Court and
not ccmtestei :::: appea:.., ·.;as :he direct, acti•;e and proximate
cat:se o: ?er~·~sc:-.· s ::c::e:-.::.a~ :..iabi~i.:y to Oborn •.1nder their
agree::e:-.:
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to relief, judgment shall be entered although the relief to
which the party is entitled was not specifically prayed for in
the pleadings.

Rule 54(c)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Replacement Vol. 9B (1953 Rev.Ed.). Cf., Rule 54(c), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Moore's Federal Practice,Vol. 6, ,54.62, pp.
126lff.

See, also,

201 (6th Cir. 1961);
1973).

Da:nn v. Studebaker-Packard Corporation, 288 F .2d
Ortiz v. EngZebrecht, 61 FRD 381 (D.C. N.J.

Even though the claimant may not be entitled to the

specific relief requested, the Court may retain jurisdiction to
grant declaratory relief as established by the evidence.

Ortiz

v. EngZebrecht, supra.

All parties required in an action for declaratory relie:
were present in this action.

See, §78-33-11, Utah Code Annotated.

Replacement Volume 9A (1953 Rev.ed.).

In no way would the entryc:

a declaratory judgment against the Dysons prejudice an interested
party, including the Dysons, since all were present and had an
opportunity to contest and litigate the evidence presented.

The

issue of Ferguson's damages, if any, could be ascertained in
a supplemental proceeding.

See, §78-33-8, Utah Code Annotated.

CONCLUSION
Having raised no objections to the findings regarding
their breach of contract and negligence nor objections to the
evidence underlying those findings, the Dysons have abandoned
their appeal of the plaintiffs' judgment and same should be deniec
However, inasmuchas the appeal of the plaintiffs' judgment was
solely to delay making payment on it, the Dysons should be penal·
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ized for this abuse of the appellate process and the plaintiffs
compensated for their damages in such abuse by assessing the
Dysons 25% of the judgment amount.

Plaintiffs are entitled to

a reversal of the trial courts determination on the interest
rate and are entitled to be awarded 10.58% interest on the judgment from the date of loss until paid.

Plaintiffs should be

awarded their attorneys fees incurred in this appeal and in
the trial of this matter.

Plaintiff-Intervenor Gary Ferguson

should be awarded his attorneys fees incurred in this appeal
and in the trial of this matter and should be awarded declaratory
judgment against the Dysons adjudging them liable to him for
damages he may sustain by reason his liability to Oborn.

The

determination of those damages should be reserved for subsequent
proceeding.>.
Resp~tively

submitted this

~day of October, 1978.

R. CLARK ARNOLD of and for
Reynolds & Arnold
Attorneys for Gary Ferguson.
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